Brief: Federalist Papers and the Limitations on Presidential Power
The following is a brief analysis of how the Federalist Papers emphasize the importance of the separation of powers and limit the president's authority, requiring decisions to be made collectively by Congress and the other branches. Additional pages also provide implications and steps citizens can take if such violations occur. The Federalist Papers, particularly Federalist No. 51 and Federalist No. 70, underscore the foundational principle that the U.S. President is not granted unchecked authority to make decisions or issue orders independently. Instead, the Constitution establishes a system of checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to prevent any single branch—especially the presidency—from becoming tyrannical. When these are violated, read the following, "Brief: Citizens' Rights and Consequences of Congress and Government Following Unconstitutional Presidential Orders According the the Federalist Papers".
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (MADISON)
James Madison emphasizes the importance of a separation of powers, asserting that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition" to prevent any one branch from dominating others. Madison advocates for a structure where each branch is empowered to check the others, thereby ensuring that no single individual, including the president, can unilaterally make decisions without oversight or collaboration with Congress and the judiciary (Madison, 1788).
FEDERALIST NO. 70 (HAMILTON)
Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong but accountable executive branch, noting that the president must be able to act swiftly when necessary but still remains accountable to the constitutional framework. Importantly, Hamilton advocates that significant decisions, especially those affecting laws and policies, should involve legislative approval rather than unilateral presidential action (Hamilton, 1788). This perspective implies that the president's role is to execute laws passed by Congress, not to create policy independently.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Together, these Federalist writings establish that the president's powers are derived from and limited by the Constitution, requiring legislative approval for many actions. The framers designed a government where decisions of great consequence are made collectively—through Congress and the other branches—rather than solely by the president.
References
Madison, J. (1788). Federalist No. 51. In The Federalist Papers.
Hamilton, A. (1788). Federalist No. 70. In The Federalist Papers.
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (MADISON)
James Madison emphasizes the importance of a separation of powers, asserting that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition" to prevent any one branch from dominating others. Madison advocates for a structure where each branch is empowered to check the others, thereby ensuring that no single individual, including the president, can unilaterally make decisions without oversight or collaboration with Congress and the judiciary (Madison, 1788).
FEDERALIST NO. 70 (HAMILTON)
Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong but accountable executive branch, noting that the president must be able to act swiftly when necessary but still remains accountable to the constitutional framework. Importantly, Hamilton advocates that significant decisions, especially those affecting laws and policies, should involve legislative approval rather than unilateral presidential action (Hamilton, 1788). This perspective implies that the president's role is to execute laws passed by Congress, not to create policy independently.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Together, these Federalist writings establish that the president's powers are derived from and limited by the Constitution, requiring legislative approval for many actions. The framers designed a government where decisions of great consequence are made collectively—through Congress and the other branches—rather than solely by the president.
References
Madison, J. (1788). Federalist No. 51. In The Federalist Papers.
Hamilton, A. (1788). Federalist No. 70. In The Federalist Papers.
What Can You Do?
Read the following, "Brief: Citizens' Rights and Consequences of Congress and Government Following Unconstitutional Presidential Orders According the the Federalist Papers".
